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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 1 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

(Sweden)

63-11874

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES

Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato M. HAMID

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C.H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.G. USACHEV

Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. D.E. MARK

Mr. T.R. PICKERING

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Sweden): I declare open the one hundred and sixteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BLUSZTJN (Poland)(translation from French): The Polish delegation has already had occasion to define its position concerning the problem of a nuclear test ban.

In our statement of 6 March (ENDC/PV.105, pp.26-33) we tried to show how illogical was the attitude of the Western Powers towards inspection in relation to the prohibition of nuclear tests. We pointed out that although the Western Powers claimed to be arguing from a scientific standpoint, they were in fact guided by political considerations when it came to fixing the annual quota of on-site inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations.

Subsequent statements of representatives of the Western Powers have fully confirmed the justice of this contention.

In the first place, in their speeches of 8 and 11 March, the United Kingdom and United States representatives gave a direct confirmation of the fact that their attitude to the problem we are considering was determined by political considerations (ENDC/PV.106, pp. 10-18 and 33-36, ENDC/PV.107, pp.5-14).

In the second place, discussion of the problem of control over a nuclear test ban has provided new data which support our view.

I should like today to draw the Committee's attention to these new elements, since they show more clearly than ever the political aim behind the methodology adopted by the Western Powers regarding control of a nuclear test ban.

The negotiations which have taken place hitherto on the prohibition of nuclear tests have brought out the elements which must be contained by the control system in any future agreement on a nuclear test ban. We are agreed that the future control system should consist of:

- (1) National stations of detection and identification;
- (2) Automatic seismic stations;
- (3) An international centre which, on the basis of the records furnished by national stations and automatic installations, would analyse seismic events;
- (4) On-site inspection.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

In spite of this agreement, certain fundamental differences still remain regarding the respective functions of the various elements of the control system and their hierarchy.

Although the equal importance of the various elements has been formally recognized, as is borne out by the statement of Mr. Stelle, head of the United States delegation, on 8 March 1963, the United States still places the main emphasis on on-site inspection. Nevertheless the importance of this element can hardly be regarded as equal to that of the other elements of the control system, let alone as greater. This is due to the qualitatively different function of on-site inspection.

If the object of the whole network of seismic stations forming part of the control system, and of the automatic installations, is to furnish the data required for determining the manner in which a nuclear test ban is being observed, the function of inspection is necessarily reduced to providing the other side with an additional safeguard against the risk of a hypothetical violation of the agreement, by making it possible to verify a suspicious event on the spot.

The privileged position given to on-site inspection in the United States conception of control has therefore no scientific basis and must be inspired by other motives.

If we wish to approach this problem objectively, we must realize that the three main elements of the general control system, namely national detection and identification stations, automatic seismic stations installed in the territory of nuclear Powers and in the territory of other countries, and the international centre for collecting and processing data furnished by a world-wide network of stations, constitute a basis which is more than adequate for recording and identifying any event.

It cannot be overemphasized that the system devised by the Socialist countries very largely meets the view which has been expressed here on many occasions by the representatives of the non-aligned countries, namely that the interest which all humanity has in the prohibition of nuclear tests should have as its counterpart the co-operation of the whole international scientific community in ensuring that commitments entered into under the terms of the treaty are duly honoured. National stations therefore, wherever installed, only constitute one element forming part of a coherent and co-ordinated whole.

There can be no doubt that a system of this kind would appreciably increase the effectiveness of isolated national networks.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Western Powers have adopted an attitude towards this problem which, to say the least, is entirely inconsistent. They maintain that they can only trust their own national systems. This mistrust moreover embraces everything which is not under their direct control, and they go so far as to deny the desirability of setting up an international system. According to the Western representatives, the national network of any country would only prove useful and effective for the detection of events taking place on the territory of the other party. Nevertheless seismographic instruments record all events in the same way, whether they take place in the territory of the Soviet Union, of the United States or of some third country.

Even if we adopt the Western view that events which are difficult to identify can still take place under present conditions, we must also bear in mind that it is the instruments located in the territory of the country where a suspicious event has occurred which can provide the most complete data for identifying the suspicious event, especially when these data are contrasted and compared with data collected by stations in other States.

Strangely enough the United States believes that it is easier to record and identify a seismic event with instruments located at a distance of 10,000 kilometres than with the means available on the spot. But that is not all. What, in my view, is infinitely more serious is the fact that the United States authorities are themselves in the process of adapting their estimate of the efficiency of their own detection networks to the number of on-site inspections they demand.

This was brought out very eloquently by Senator Humphrey, who, in addressing the United States Senate on 7 March 1963, made the following statement:

"The fact is that our detection capability is much greater than the press has let us to believe on the basis of the information it has received from the U.S. Government" (ENDC/82, p.20).

Mr. Humphrey complained bitterly that all information regarding progress in the field of seismology was kept secret, and he makes this pathetic appeal to the President of the United States, with which we must all wish to associate ourselves:

"... the American people need to know the facts. Tell the American people of our detection system. Tell them what we have. We are always telling them what a big bomb we have. Tell them what a good detection system we have." (ibid., p.24)

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

If we really wish to deal scientifically with the problem of the utilization of recent advances in science and technology, we cannot accept the reasoning that seismic instruments installed in the territory of the United States can only be useful and effective in the case of events which take place in the territory of the Soviet Union and vice versa, since this excludes any possibility of their use within an international system of control for events occurring in their own territory.

If we wish to create a system of effective control, we cannot eliminate national elements; on the contrary, in order to ensure full and complete objectivity, we must try to create conditions in which the fullest use can be made of such elements. This, of course, presupposes that equal value is attached to the national stations of all the States belonging to the international control system. Is that not the intention of the Joint Memorandum of the eight non-aligned countries (ENDC/28) in which the idea of collaboration between the international control centre and national stations is quite clearly expressed?

What alternative do the Western States propose? They attempt to define the role of national systems of detection within the general control system in such a way as to justify the alleged necessity for a superfluous number of on-site inspections, which would moreover give a country the possibility of paralysing the operation of the international control centre in practice by subordinating it to the discretion of one of the parties.

For months the Western delegations have been repeating that their position is based on the results of the most recent scientific research. We were told that although recent progress in the field of seismology had enabled the number of suspicious events in the Soviet Union to be reduced, there were still between 70 and 100 seismic events which could arouse doubts as to their nature and origin. The Committee will certainly be interested to hear, however, that according to Senator Humphrey -- I refer to the speech which he made in the United States Senate on 7 March last -- there now only remain a dozen doubtful events to be accounted for (ENDC/82, p.35).

Has the United States delegation drawn the necessary conclusions from these facts? It would seem not. On the contrary, it appears that as its position becomes scientifically untenable, the United States delegation takes refuge in intransigence, and its statements that the number of inspections is immaterial do not change this attitude. The fact remains that the United States is insisting on a number of inspections which it knows in advance to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union. This is tantamount to saying that the number is immaterial provided it corresponds to the demands of the United States delegation.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Obviously such an attitude makes any discussion of the modalities of on-site inspection useless and academic. Last Monday, the Soviet delegation proposed a formula which might have got negotiations under way again (ENDC/PV.113, p.21). Unfortunately, it was rejected by the United States delegation.

Scientific analysis of the combination of elements making up the control system must lead to the conclusion that on-site inspection occupies a subordinate place among these elements, and that its necessity is determined by the effectiveness of the other elements of the control system.

In this connexion I should like to point out that the application of on-site inspection is limited by other important factors which are political rather than scientific. On-site inspection constitutes to a certain extent a limitation of the sovereignty of the country where it takes place.

This has several consequences. It implies in particular that inspection can only be resorted to in cases where other means of detection are incapable of furnishing sufficient data to identify the event, and further, that such inspection will be carried out with a minimum of compulsion and with a maximum consideration of the sovereign rights and interests of the countries concerned.

That is a point which is beginning more and more to dominate United States literature on the problem of disarmament. I should like, in this connexion, to quote a relevant passage from the report entitled "Verification and Response in Disarmament Agreements" which represents the results of a seminar held last summer at Woods Hole. After recognizing that inspection only constitutes one of the means of verification, this report goes on:

(continued in English)

"Inspection, which has often been used synonymously with verification, has appeared to be a key principle of US disarmament policy and the focus of Soviet resistance to the Western position. However, inspection is not a principle but a particular method of obtaining information necessary for verification. In meeting verification requirements for any particular measure, it is essential to use inspection only in so far as other sources of information are unable to supply information needed for acceptable verification".

(continued in French)

If the United States delegation would only conform to the requirements which have been quoted, if it would adopt a really objective attitude towards on-site inspection, the way might be opened for the rapid conclusion of an agreement to prohibit nuclear tests

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Soviet Union's compromise proposals have created the necessary conditions for the conclusion of an agreement to ban all tests. Nothing prevents the conclusion of such an agreement but the desire of certain circles in the United States to continue the improvement of nuclear weapons, and the obstinacy of the supporters of the cold war who fear the good effect which the termination of the nuclear armaments race would have on the relations between East and West.

It is true that we have travelled a long way and that now only one small step remains. But that step is a decisive one, not only because it will determine whether or not there is to be an agreement to cease nuclear tests, but also because it will prove whether the Western Powers are prepared to commit themselves resolutely to the easing of tension, which could lead to the solution of the various outstanding problems and hasten the advent of stable peace in a world without arms.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): At our meetings on 13 March (ENDC/PV. 108; pp.5-10), 18 March (ENDC/PV.110 pp.19-26) and 25 March (ENDC/PV.113, pp.5-9) I outlined to the Conference a new United States position put forward to assist us towards agreement on a treaty which will end all nuclear weapon tests. We have repeatedly urged the Soviet representative either to tell us the Soviet position on the points that we put forward in those statements or to comment on the United States proposals. We have urged him to do that so that we may enter into real negotiations on all the broad issues which must be settled before we can reach full agreement, even in principle, on a test ban treaty and then begin the necessary work on the details of a treaty.

At the meeting on 13 March we indicated briefly the role we believe automatic seismic stations might play in the control system. Today we should like to discuss the concept of such stations as it has developed in the course of our negotiations. We shall also amplify certain of our previous remarks concerning our present position on the use of automatic stations.

Recent serious consideration of the use of unmanned seismic stations dates from a proposal signed by three Soviet and three United States scientists at the tenth Conference on Science and World Affairs held in London last September. That proposal is before us as document ENDC/66, and I commend it to the Committee's attention. As is clear from the last paragraph of the document, the scientists who signed it were not stating categorically that such a system would work in the manner described but were putting forward the idea as one which might be feasible and which should be studied.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

As a result of that paper and of the interest it aroused, the United States Government renewed its technical studies to see in what way the use of such stations might assist us towards agreement.

Last autumn the Soviet representative made a proposal (ENDC/PV.90, p.15), for the use of automatic seismic stations. The Soviet Union stated that it was prepared to agree that two or three such stations be set up on the territory of each State possessing nuclear weapons, and it suggested that they be located in seismic areas. The Soviet representative further indicated that in the Soviet Union the most suitable sites would be near the towns of Yakutsk, Kokchetav and Bodaibo. The Soviet Union preferred that delivery of the appropriate sealed apparatus for periodic replacement in the automatic stations in the Soviet Union be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft. However, it was indicated that the Soviet Union was prepared to permit the delivery and installation of the apparatus by foreign personnel, subject to appropriate precautionary measures to ensure that such foreign personnel would not engage in espionage.

The Soviet Union suggested also that some automatic seismic stations be set up near the borders of the nuclear Powers, subject to the agreement of the States on whose territory such stations would be located. The correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy (ENDC/73, 74) indicates agreement that such stations might be located in Hokkaido, Japan, and in Pakistan and Afghanistan, subject of course to the consent of the Governments concerned. The United States has asked the Soviet Union why such stations should be automatic instead of manned stations, but has as yet received no answer. For its part the United States sees no reason why, with the consent of the Governments concerned, those stations should not be manned stations rather than unmanned stations.

The Western Powers were very interested in the Soviet proposal for automatic stations on the territories of the nuclear Powers. Their representatives asked the Soviet representative what characteristics and capabilities such stations might have. We found, however, that the Soviet representative had no ideas which he would put forward on those subjects. He stated that the Western Powers must accept the use of unmanned stations in principle before any details could be discussed. Nevertheless the Western Powers did feel that that move forward by the Soviet Union was encouraging. In particular it showed that the Soviet Union could admit some foreign personnel on to its soil without fear of their being used for espionage purposes.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The discussions held in New York and Washington in January were of some assistance in bringing the two sides closer together on the use of unmanned stations. The United States representatives suggested ten areas in the United States where automatic seismic stations might be located, and furnished the average seismic noise levels at those sites. The Soviet Union proposed three areas in the United States for the emplacement of stations. The Soviet Union agreed to accept one of the ten areas suggested by the United States in lieu of one of the areas which it had proposed, but insisted on retaining the other two automatic station sites at the locations which it first suggested. The United States did not object to that. So with regard to stations on the territory of the United States there seems to be agreement on at least three areas where the Soviet Union would wish to locate stations.

The United States has also suggested ten areas in the Soviet Union where the United States would wish to locate stations. We asked the Soviet representative to recommend specific sites for automatic stations within those ten areas on the basis of the knowledge of Soviet scientists concerning noise levels and other factors. The station that the Soviet Union had suggested for Bodaibo was also on the United States list, and for the stations at Yakutsk and Kokchetav the Soviet Union agreed to substitute stations at Seymchan and Samarkand. At the last private meeting the Soviet Union gave us noise levels for those three locations.

Also during the course of those private discussions the United States indicated that it might be prepared to reduce from ten to seven the number of automatic seismic stations in the territories of the Soviet Union and the United States.

The private talks did result in agreement on three sites for automatic stations in the territory of both the Soviet Union and the United States, although from the United States point of view agreement has still to be reached on the location of at least four additional stations in the territory of each country. As those stations will be at fixed locations, and as the travel of personnel to and from them can be subjected to safeguards against the possibility of espionage, we fail to see why the Soviet Union cannot readily agree to accept four more such stations.

As I indicated earlier, the Western Powers have had some difficulty in evaluating the possible use of automatic stations because the Soviet representatives who originally formally proposed their use, have failed to provide any practical information about them. However, in our statement on 13 March (ENDC/PV.103, pp.5-10) we indicated how we envisaged the operation of those stations. In our view, the United States, the United

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Kingdom and the Soviet Union would agree to the specifications for the automatic recording stations, and each country would have the responsibility of building the appropriate vaults and providing certain other components of the stations in its own territory. Then each side would supply recorders and certain other instruments which would be installed and sealed in the stations on the territory of the other side. In view of the difficulty of ensuring the reliable operation of an automatic station for a long period entirely unattended, the host country would have certain responsibilities for maintenance of such stations.

In our view, personnel from the other nuclear side and from the international commission should have the right to visit the stations a maximum of eight times each year at the initiative of the other nuclear side. As I indicated on 18 March (ENDC/PV.110, p.23-26), during the period of one week after the designation of an event the designating State, if it so desired, could have the data collected from the sealed portion of one or more of the automatic seismic stations. In addition to those important visits for the purpose of obtaining data on a particular event, the automatic stations would be visited as necessary for retrieving data and preparing recorders for further operation, and for maintenance, calibration of instruments, installation of improved equipment or checking of seismic noise levels. However, all such visits would have to take place within the maximum permitted total of eight a year.

Another important problem encountered in working out how such stations might best be used has been that of the recovery of recordings often enough for them to be available within a reasonably short time after the occurrence of a seismic event. In order to meet that problem we have suggested (ENDC/PV.108, p.9) that the data from each automatic seismic station should also be recorded outside the sealed portion of the station on a recording device identical to the one within the sealed portion of the station. That data would be picked up frequently, perhaps once a week, by the host country and sent to the international commission for its use and for transmission to the other side. In that way each side would have a constant flow of information from the automatic stations which would give it confidence in the accuracy of the data received from national stations, and would also be of help in identifying seismic events and locating epicentres. The data from the unsealed recorder, in turn, could be checked from time to time against the data from the sealed recorder at each station.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

So much for my remarks on automatic seismic stations. I should now like to turn to some more general considerations concerning our negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty.

All the representatives here have referred to the exchange of letters (ENDC/73,74) between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy as having given a new impetus to our negotiations. As a result of that correspondence there now seems to be a new basis for agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. The basic elements of that agreement would be reliance on national seismic detection stations, the use of automatic stations and the carrying out of a relatively small number of on-site inspections of unidentified seismic events each year. It is readily apparent that such a control system is different from the kinds of systems we were discussing last fall.

The United States has also reduced its requirements concerning the number of on-site inspections. As Mr. Foster described to the Committee on 1 March (ENDC/PV.104, p.20), Mr. Dean indicated to Mr. Kuznetsov on 7 November last in New York that the United States might be willing to accept as few as eight to ten on-site inspections in the Soviet Union, and during this session of our Conference the United States has given yet further evidence of its flexibility by declaring its willingness to accept a number as low as seven, provided the arrangements for on-site inspection are adequate (ENDC/73, p.1).

As a result of the new control system and the small number of on-site inspections now under discussion it is important that inspection be methodically and efficiently carried out so as to make each inspection as reliable as possible. Only in that way will it be possible for each party to have the confidence in the observance of the treaty obligations by all parties which is so essential to the continuing existence of the treaty and to the building of confidence between the parties.

We believe the use of the principle of reciprocal inspection will best provide the deterrent and confidence-building effect which we all desire in a test ban treaty. Consequently, our new position is based on that concept. That means that each nuclear side will have the primary responsibility for detecting and analysing seismic events in the territory of the other, and for initiating and conducting a small, agreed number of on-site inspections.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

At our meetings on 13 March (ENDC/PV.108), 18 March (ENDC/PV.110) and 25 March (ENDC/PV.113) I described the main points of our new position based on that concept, and today I have amplified that exposition with some further clarification of our practical proposals on how automatic seismic stations could be used in the control network. Permit me to list very briefly the main points.

First, we believe that each nuclear side should designate the events it wishes to inspect in the territory of the other, submitting seismic data to locate the event and indicating that it cannot be identified as an earthquake according to agreed criteria.

Second, it will be necessary to arrive at agreement on the scientific criteria which would be used to determine whether an event had been located and could not be identified as natural in origin. Past negotiations with the Soviet Union resulted in considerable agreement in that area, and we ask the Soviet representative to reaffirm the points of agreement reached earlier and to work out understandings on the points not previously agreed upon.

Third, we believe that after the country in whose territory a designated event has taken place has had an opportunity to present additional data concerning the event, and there has been an opportunity to consider the data obtained from automatic stations, the other nuclear side should make the decision whether to select that event for on-site inspection within the quota of inspections.

Fourth, we have proposed (ENDC/PV.110, p.25) that the area subject to inspection be an ellipse with a semi-major axis of not more than fifteen kilometres and an area of not more than 500 square kilometres.

Fifth, we have proposed (ENDC/PV.108, p.7) that certain important functions of inspection teams be performed by technical experts from the other nuclear side in order to maximize the deterrent and confidence-building effect of each inspection. In addition, we have outlined (ibid. p.89) what operations the team might actually perform within the inspection area.

Sixth, we have proposed (ibid. p.9) various safeguards for the security of the host country, including exclusion of sensitive defence installations from the inspection area and provisions to ensure that members of inspections teams or foreign personnel visiting unmanned seismic stations do not have the opportunity to engage in improper activities.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Finally, we have indicated that a discussion of all these main points, not in minute detail but in broad outline, will be of assistance in arriving at a parallel agreement on another main issue: the actual number of on-site inspections.

In order that representatives may have a clear idea of our new position, and for the convenience of all those interested in the progress of our discussions, the United Kingdom and the United States are submitting today a memorandum of position ^{1/} setting forth the main points of their new proposals, which we ask the Secretariat to reproduce as a Conference document and to distribute to all delegations. We hope the document will be of assistance to the progress of our negotiations. We invite all representatives, and particularly the representative of the Soviet Union, to study it and we hope for their comments on it.

We earnestly appeal to the Soviet Government to reconsider its present refusal to discuss anything but the Soviet-proposed number of on-site inspections and the Soviet-proposed number of automatic stations. We ask the Soviet Union to join with us in real negotiations on all the major issues involved in a nuclear test ban treaty.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests has been very fully discussed in our Committee. The positions of the sides have been clarified to the utmost. It would therefore be appropriate, perhaps, to take stock of the whole picture of the negotiations, both the forefront and the background. This will give us an opportunity to determine objectively the reasons for the deadlock and the failure of the negotiations and, if possible, to persuade the side responsible for the situation that has come about to adopt a more realistic position in accordance with the needs of the moment. The actual situation in regard to the basic problems of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is characterized by the fact that the positions of the two sides have been brought considerably closer together. This is shown by such a fact as the admission by the United States, after lengthy negotiations, that national systems are adequate for control over an agreement. This is reflected in the fact that the United States is now prepared to agree to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water without any form of international control or inspection in regard to such explosions.

^{1/} Subsequently issued as ENDC/78

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As regards underground explosions, this problem could have been resolved in exactly the same way, but because of the demand for inspection in regard to significant suspicious seismic events put forward by the United States, the negotiations reached a deadlock. In order to break this deadlock the Soviet Government decided to make a big political concession to the Government of the United States and agreed to a quota of two to three inspections a year on the territory of the nuclear Powers.

Thus, in this decisive question also, thanks to this concession by the Soviet Union, the positions of the sides have come closer together, and the main obstacle in the way of an agreement has now been removed. This can be said with all the more justification since the Soviet Union has accepted the number of inspections which had, in fact, been proposed to the Soviet Union by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom both informally and officially.

Everyone expected that this concession on the part of the Soviet Union would be duly appreciated by the United States and that an agreement would be speedily concluded. As a result of the goodwill displayed by the Soviet Union and its striving for an agreement on a compromise, mutually acceptable basis, we now have the following picture in regard to control over underground explosions. If an agreement were concluded, control over underground nuclear explosions would be carried out in the following manner -- I shall now list the components of such a control system:

1. The national observation networks of the nuclear Powers;
2. The national observation networks of other non-nuclear Powers, that is socialist countries and countries forming part of Western military blocs;
3. The national networks of the non-aligned countries;
4. The network of United States seismic stations scattered over foreign countries, mainly around the boundaries of the Soviet Union;
5. The installation of three seismic stations each on the territory of the Soviet Union and the territory of the United States;
6. The installation of seismic stations on the territory of countries adjacent to the Soviet Union and the United States;
7. An international centre for collecting and processing data received from national observation systems and automatic seismic stations;
8. An agreement on two to three on-site inspections a year on the territory of the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

As you see, this control system, taken as a whole, is sufficiently many-sided and reliable to ensure confidence that a nuclear test ban treaty is being complied with. In any case, all these measures are more than sufficient for the first step, as an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests appears to us to be. The Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on this basis, and the fact that there is no agreement is due to the demand of the United States for an increased number of inspections. The question of the inspection quota is now the main obstacle in the way of an agreement and it should be overcome. Unfortunately, the United States delegation is stubbornly avoiding the solution of this question and, carrying on here a curious dialogue with itself, it continues to expound its point of view on various technical details, the discussion of which, in the absence of agreement on the inspection quota, is a sheer waste of time of the whole Committee.

Again at today's meeting the representative of the United States has busied himself with the same thankless task, but we shall not go along that path and shall continue to insist on the solution of the question of the inspection quota, which would open the way to an agreement. At present I shall deal briefly with this question once again, and I shall try to show the complete inconsistency of the position which the United States is taking on the question of the inspection quota.

At the meeting on 1 March the United States representative, Mr. Foster, stated that:

"The present Soviet acceptance of three on-site inspections should be considered, not as some sort of gift to the Western Powers, but rather as a partial recognition of reality".

He added:

"We hope the Soviet Union will give greater credence to scientific reality in the course of these negotiations". (ENDC/PV.104, p.17)

That statement by Mr. Foster deserves to be studied more closely. Everyone knows the position of the Soviet Union in this matter: if the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is really desired, then the main question on which we differ -- the question of the inspection quota -- must be solved not on the basis of a technical approach, on which the United States keeps insisting, but on the basis of a political compromise, on which we keep insisting, and as this was recognized and proposed by the United Kingdom Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, as far back as February, 1959, during his visit to Moscow.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But even if we look at the question of the inspection quota from the United States viewpoint, that is to say in the light of the technical arguments by which the United States delegation is guided, in that case also we discover a flagrant lack of correspondence between the number of inspections on which the United States delegation insists and its own technical arguments which it puts forward to justify the number of inspections.

Reverting to the afore-mentioned statement by Mr. Foster and in order finally to elucidate the nature of the position of the United States in this matter, let us avail ourselves of his advice --- I quote his words --- "to give greater credence to scientific reality in the course of these negotiations".

Let us bear in mind that the United States representatives, in referring to science, have always made the number of inspections dependent on the number of suspicious seismic events. Until about the middle of 1962 the United States was of the opinion that the annual number of such events in the territory of the Soviet Union would be in the range of 600 - 700. Subsequently, having carried out some sort of manipulation with that figure and reduced it to roughly half, the United States proposed at that time that the number of inspections for the verification at random of suspicious seismic events should be approximately 12 - 20 a year.

Starting from about the middle of last year, the United States began to admit that it had put the number of suspicious seismic events for the Soviet Union several times too high and that, in fact, the number of events was not more than 170 a year, and not 600 - 700, as it had previously asserted. Further explanations by the United States reduced even this figure by more than half, bringing the number of suspicious seismic events in Soviet territory down to about 60 - 70 a year.

The matter having taken that turn, the United States was compelled to reduce somewhat its claims and demands in regard to inspections and began to insist on the figure of 8 - 10 inspections a year. But even that number of suspicious seismic events -- I mean 60 - 70 in the territory of the Soviet Union -- proved to be at least 5 - 6 times too high. That fact was recognized by Senator Humphrey in the speech he made in the United States Senate on 7 March 1963 when he stated (ENDC/82, p.35) that the annual number of significant suspicious seismic events in the Soviet Union was only about a dozen.

I should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to that statement made by Senator Humphrey.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

If we follow the scientific approach, then recognition of this most important fact should entail a reduction of the number of inspections also by five to six times. However, on this point the United States had shown very great "modesty" and an obviously unscientific approach, and for the number of annual inspections the admission by the United States that the number of suspicious events in territory of the Soviet Union was five to six times smaller had very scanty results: the United States reduced the proposed number of inspections by only one unit and began to insist on seven inspections a year. This new attitude of the United States in no way accords with its own approach, namely, that one out of five, that is every fifth significant suspicious seismic event should be verified. But the figure named by the Soviet Union -- two to three inspections a year -- would amply fulfil the task of verifying the ten to twelve suspicious seismic events a year likely to occur in the territory of the Soviet Union, as Senator Humphrey admitted in his speech on 7 March.

Thus there have recently been revealed in the United States new facts which are of very great importance for the fate of our negotiations and which give us grounds for hope. I am referring to the facts and data openly mentioned in the United States Senate on 7 March during a discussion on an agreement to ban nuclear weapon tests.

Senator Humphrey, who has been dealing for a long time and with great competence with the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, made the following admission in the United States Senate in an official speech delivered on 7 March, that is about three weeks ago:--

- (1) The United States no longer needs detection stations with international personnel on Soviet territory, because its detection and identification capabilities make this unnecessary;
- (2) The number of inspections is sufficient when compared with the number of events in the Soviet Union which might be highly suspicious.

Mr. Humphrey went on to say that at one time the United States proposed twelve to twenty inspections, when it was working on the assumption that the number of unidentified significant suspicious events in the Soviet Union was from 70 to 100. He said that the United States proposed to inspect roughly one out of five unidentified significant suspicious events.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Further, speaking of the latest more precise data on the number of significant seismic events in the territory of the Soviet Union which could really be considered suspicious, Senator Humphrey stated that the number of such events would be about a dozen, whereas according to the earlier United States estimate they numbered from 70 to 100. He said that the United States could easily keep the same ratio of the number of inspections to the number of events.

That statement of Senator Humphrey, if translated into the language of facts and figures, means the following: according to the new, more precise estimate, the number of important and suspicious seismic events in the territory of the Soviet Union will be about a dozen, that is, ten to twelve events.

The ratio of the number of inspections to the number of such events, as proposed by the United States, is one to five, that is, one out of every five significant suspicious seismic events would be subject to verification.

The rest is a matter of simple arithmetic. If the number of such events in the Soviet Union is about a dozen, that is ten to twelve a year, then if we apply the aforementioned ratio -- to verify one event out of five -- we find that the number of inspections per year should not be more than two to two and a half. As you see, the figure of two to three inspections a year proposed by the Soviet Union represents a very generous response on the part of the Soviet Union, and on that basis it should be possible to reach agreement without delay.

Those are the new and very important facts and data, which introduce a very hopeful atmosphere into our discussion.

Finally, the truth begins to emerge from the innermost recesses of the government machinery of the United States, and this truth gives us a ray of hope.

With regard to the capabilities of the United States detection system, Senator Humphrey said:

"... the United States system is capable of detecting some seismic events below the presumed 'threshold', so that no nation could be sure that its clandestine tests would go undetected." (ENDC/82, p.20)

Speaking in the Senate on 7 March, Senator Humphrey made a very remarkable statement in which he referred directly to the fact that in the United States the opponents of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests were deliberately concealing the true facts concerning the effectiveness of the United States observation system and he called for these facts to be put before the public.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Senator Humphrey said:

"The fact is that our detection capability is much greater than the press has led us to believe on the basis of the information it has received from the United States Government." (ibid. loc. cit.)

The representative of Poland, Mr. Blusztajn, has already quoted (Supra, p.7) this morning a part of Senator Humphrey's statement; since that part of the Senator's statement contains admissions which are extremely important to these negotiations, I shall also take the liberty of quoting it. He said the following:

"I have said to the President and to those responsible for our position on nuclear tests that the American people need to know the facts. Tell the American people of our detection system. Tell them what we have. We are always telling them what a big bomb we have. Tell them what a good detection system we have. I do not say that it is foolproof or perfect. I merely say the results in 3 years of research are phenomenal." (ibid., p. 24)

I could add that the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rusk, at the hearing which took place under the Chairmanship of Senator Humphrey on 11 March, said:

"The United States capability to detect violations of a nuclear test ban is better than can be revealed."

There is no doubt that the new facts and data which I have cited must be taken into account in our negotiations. They confirm with exceptional force the correctness and validity of the Soviet position and the incontrovertible acceptability to the United States of the Soviet Union's compromise proposal of two to three inspections a year.

It is now up to the United States of America. In view of the facts I cited, there is no longer any question of the figure of two to three inspections a year being unacceptable to the United States, as the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, has been asserting here at every meeting. I do not wish to think ill of Mr. Stelle and therefore I assume that it is inertia which causes him to keep repeating that two to three inspections are unacceptable to the United States. In the light of the new facts: on the one hand, regarding the number of significant unidentified events in the Soviet Union -- ten to twelve a year in all -- and, on the other hand, regarding the phenomenal progress in the development of the United States observation system, the objections of the United States delegation to the Soviet proposal for a quota of two to three inspections a year are no longer tenable.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Against the background of the new data and facts referred to, the armoury of arguments used by the representatives of the United States has now been depleted of even those scientific grounds for rejecting our proposed quota of two to three inspections a year, to which the United States delegation has constantly referred. That rejection now has the appearance, not of a well-founded position, but of a whim, a caprice, sheer wantonness.

It is now clear to everyone that the negative position of the United States is not based on scientific and technical considerations, but on purely political motives. It is now obvious to everyone that the divergences and differences with regard to the number of inspections do not derive from the number of significant suspicious seismic events in the territory of the Soviet Union but are simply the result of pressure brought to bear on our Conference from across the Ocean by those who oppose an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

We hope, however, that there are in the United States enough powerful and far-sighted forces which will be able to ensure an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, an agreement which is already so near and at the same time still so far.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I have no intention of making a lengthy address to the Conference this morning, but I should like to make just one or two quite brief observations.

I would start by saying that I think it would be generally accepted that the base on which our discussions on this subject have developed in the Conference during the period since we reconvened early in February has been the acceptance, or re-acceptance, by one of the nuclear Powers of the principle of the on-site inspection of a portion of unidentified seismic events which might be nuclear explosions.

During the past few meetings we in the West have attempted to outline our views on the application of the principle of on-site inspection; in other words, to explain how we feel the system of inspection should be ordered. In addition, we have heard from our United States colleague this morning (Supra, pp.10-16) some observations on automatic seismic stations.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Also, we have perhaps reached a certain stage in our discussions with the presentation by the two Western nuclear Powers of a memorandum (ENDC/78) to the Conference outlining our views on the form which the inspection system should take. That document will, I feel sure, be studied carefully. Naturally, I do not wish to go through it now at any length, but I should like to say two things regarding it.

First, we in the West naturally believe that the proposals contained in the memorandum conform to what we regard as the essential need to establish in this vital matter a system in which those who are signatories to an agreement, and indeed the world at large, can feel confidence. But we have always said, and I say it again today, repeating what our United States colleague said earlier this morning, that our position on these matters is negotiable. To that I wish to add only one very simple statement, which is that negotiation is possible only on the basis of discussion.

Second, the allegation has been made from time to time that the proposals on inspection put forward by the Western side are excessively or unnecessarily complicated. It is, of course, inevitable that inspections would be complicated and that the system would be complicated. We are, after all, breaking new ground here. It is a very important new international departure and, because of that, it is not possible to assert that everything could be as simple as if the ground before us were already well trodden. But, as we have said again and again, we are only too anxious to discuss all the points and to put all our cards on the table. We should very much like the system which is finally agreed upon to be as simple as possible -- I repeat, as simple as possible -- and we are more than ready to listen with great care to any suggestions which any of our colleagues wish to offer to that end. However, it is essential, as I have just said, that the system should not be so simple as to be capable of producing among the signatories to a treaty and among those who are taking a passionate interest in the matter a feeling that it is not adequate because it is not effective enough to produce confidence.

I thought that our Polish colleague came very near to suggesting this morning that no system of inspection was really necessary (Supra, pp.5-10). I am afraid I cannot share that opinion, if only because if there were no system of inspection there would be no confidence among the signatories to a treaty.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I hope that it has been useful to the Conference that the Western Powers should have produced the memorandum; indeed I feel quite sure that many of our colleagues will feel that it has. Unfortunately we still have no response on any of those subjects from our Soviet colleague and his Eastern European colleagues. Sometimes, when I consider their position, I think of a famous pre-war cartoon which depicted three figures sitting on a dais bearing labels; the first "See nothing", the second "Hear nothing" and the third "Say nothing". I think that is probably too pessimistic, because, even though nothing has yet been said on this topic by the Eastern side, the proposals which we have put forward are undoubtedly being carefully considered and studied in Moscow and the points of view we have expressed correlated with the views which we have often been told exist -- but which we have never been allowed to see -- in almost cut and dried form in the portfolios of our Eastern European colleagues.

What is puzzling and disappointing to us is that, whatever may be seen and whatever may be heard, nothing is said. I have always thought that in negotiations it is desirable to have as clear a view as possible of the position of the other parties to the negotiations. Perhaps in that matter I am becoming old-fashioned. It does seem to me that it would be perhaps a defensible position, though barely so, if it were possible for our Soviet colleagues to claim that we in the West could not expect an expression of views from them because we in turn have not made clear our views on the numbers of inspections and automatic stations. But, of course, the West has made its views clear on those points, too. We have never denied the importance of reaching agreement on them. What we have said, and what we continue to say, is that we cannot accept arbitrary figures presented on a take it or leave it basis. We have said what -- in the light of our present knowledge and in the context of a system of procedures such as we have outlined -- we consider to be a reasonable number both of on-site inspections and of automatic seismic stations likely to be effective and capable of giving confidence to the signatories.

I shall not take up the time of the Conference by going over again the ground covered by our Soviet colleague this morning on the relation of scientific assessment to political decisions (supra, pp.16 et s.) That has been done many times, and if anybody wishes to study the Western views they have been put on record on numerous occasions during the past weeks. Nor shall I take up time by dealing with the various quotations

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which Mr. Tsarapkin read to us this morning. I noticed that he laid great stress on one quotation (supra, p. 22) from a very distinguished United States source saying that the possibilities of detection were now better than could have been revealed. That quotation said nothing about identification. In any case, our position on the question of numbers is well known and our Soviet colleagues cannot, in all fairness, say that they cannot begin to discuss the other questions which are so important in obtaining a clear and total picture of the inspection system because we are withholding vital information about our views on another point.

Therefore I suggest that the Conference has now before it a complete outline -- and I stress "outline" -- of the Western position. What we want now is to get down to drafting a treaty. I have said before, and I say again in conclusion, that we do not wish and are not trying to commit the Soviet Union in advance to anything which might prove unacceptable in the context of the treaty as a whole. All we are asking is that the Soviet Union should co-operate with us in drawing up a general picture so that we on both sides of the nuclear controversy, and the Conference as a whole, may know where we all stand.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): As there are no other speakers on the list, allow me to say a few words on behalf of the Italian delegation, as Mr. Tsarapkin has just done on behalf of his delegation, concerning the present general situation of our negotiations. I shall do so in somewhat different terms. I hope Mr. Tsarapkin will forgive me. I shall try to give an objective estimate of the work accomplished so far by our Committee and of what we must now do to fulfil our responsibilities. I shall also express the current feelings of my delegation.

My remarks will be of a general nature but I hope that they will be neither useless nor inappropriate, now that our debate has reached a stage which I consider very important and which could in the not too distant future open the way to new and interesting developments.

Both at past meetings and this morning we have heard a great many statements on a test ban treaty, some of great interest. Today the United States delegation placed before the Conference a new, full and detailed document on the cessation of nuclear tests (ENDC/78). In general, the broad participation of the delegations in

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

our work, their efforts at co-operation and the spirit of determination which they have shown during this session of our Conference show once more the profound desire of the great majority of delegations --- and I hope of all the representatives here --- to conclude a test ban treaty. The representatives of the nuclear Powers have energetically reaffirmed their points of view, but unfortunately these are still far apart. It would be futile to attempt to conceal the fact that, in spite of the rapprochement of viewpoints which has taken place in the past, the remaining differences have not been eliminated during this session.

This Committee has been faced with a rigid attitude on the part of the Soviet delegation, concerning both the basic problems and our methods of work. The Italian delegation has done its utmost to break the deadlock by insisting upon the examination of every aspect of these problems and methods of work. First of all it submitted a list of questions (ENDC/PV.103, pp.6-7), the study of which could, in its view, have constituted a useful basis for systematic and organic negotiations. The questions on this list were not chosen at random by my delegation. We merely included in it the problems raised during our work by other representatives, particularly those of countries not belonging to military alliances.

The delegations of the socialist countries considered this list useless. They were even somewhat ironic about our concern for minor problems and emphasized several times that the Italian delegation was proposing the study of mere secondary measures of an administrative and financial character, although agreement had not yet been reached on the principal questions. If the Eastern delegations had taken the trouble to examine my delegation's proposals more closely, they would have found that, on the contrary, our list included major problems, the solution of which would have placed us in a far better position for disposing of more serious difficulties. However, my delegation took into consideration the objections of the socialist delegations and suggested that we concentrate our efforts upon just a few of the questions to which it had referred.

At the meeting on 25 March my delegation proposed to the Soviet delegation that the Committee should be allowed to concentrate upon a particular problem which should certainly have been of interest to the Soviet delegation, the problem of the methods required to remove all possibility of espionage during inspections (ENDC/PV.113, pp.13-14). However, Mr. Tsarapkin replied neither to this request nor to others put forward by my delegation.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Of course, the Italian delegation has not been alone in making efforts to break the deadlock. The great majority of the delegations present here, and in particular certain representatives of the non-aligned countries, have played a considerable part in this effort by offering most interesting contributions and suggestions.

Unfortunately, all these multiple and converging efforts to secure, amongst other things, the adoption by the Committee of normal procedures of negotiation have so far been in vain. Usually, when difficulties arise on certain points in negotiations, these points are temporarily set aside and other problems are examined in the hope that their solution will in turn make it possible to solve those which have been left in abeyance. But it has not yet been possible to adopt this method of work here. The result is that after two months of debates, our Committee has still not been able to reach agreement.

In an effort of goodwill the United States and United Kingdom delegations have reduced their requirement from eight or ten to seven inspections. They have made a useful contribution to our work by submitting in writing proposals concerning methods of inspection.

Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation has rigidly maintained its figure of two or three inspections and has refused to discuss modalities or any other problem. This negative result is, alas, in contrast with the hopes with which we began our session at a time when all the delegations had declared -- and I warmly endorsed this view -- that not only was the present moment favourable, but there had never been in the past a more propitious time for an agreement.

Should I hide my apprehension and that of the Italian Government in the face of the present situation? Certainly not. The Italian Government is profoundly disturbed by the present difficulties and earnestly desires the rapid conclusion of an agreement on a nuclear test ban, in the conviction that such an agreement would be of exceptional importance for peace. We are conscious of the immense advantage which an agreement prohibiting nuclear tests would represent for all mankind. It would eliminate the dangers of fall-out which constitute a terrifying and mysterious threat to the integrity of the human race and to future generations. It would slow down the armaments race, reduce mistrust and international tension and thereby open the way to other more comprehensive agreements.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The practical application of the principle of effective inspection would constitute a very useful precedent, as it would, I am sure, provide concrete proof that inspections do not endanger those military secrets which a country has the right to preserve. It would thus have great persuasive force. Soviet distrust and the narrow and suspicious attitude which prevails in the Eastern regimes would be corrected, and this would make it easier in future to apply control within the framework of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In short, an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests would be not only a step forward but a most encouraging beginning.

I know that all these advantages are perfectly familiar to the nuclear Powers and to all the other States represented here; but I also know that the Western nuclear Powers have had these prospects constantly in mind in drawing up the compromise proposals they have submitted, and particularly in reducing the number of inspections required and in accepting national stations as the principal basis of control.

I do not doubt that the Soviet delegation is also sensitive to the voices which have been raised on all sides in favour of an agreement. However, I believe that at this stage in our debate we should once more reflect profoundly upon the immense advantages of an agreement on a nuclear test ban and compare them with the grave consequences of failure.

On the Western side we are prepared to accept the risks involved in an agreement. We know indeed that the limitation of the number of inspections accepted by the nuclear Powers will result in a number of phenomena that are doubtful remaining so. Scientific data tell us that the terms of the treaty which the United Kingdom and the United States Governments have proposed in order to reach a compromise will not give a 100 per cent guarantee. These Governments have accepted the danger involved, thus giving an initial proof of their confidence in the Soviet Union. The Italian delegation, in conjunction with all those who are anxiously awaiting the conclusion of an agreement, calls on the Soviet Union to accept also those risks of espionage which it considers to exist. To our mind these risks are non-existent, for we are convinced that concrete and appropriate means can easily be found to remove those dangers which the Soviet Union apprehends from inspections. We make every effort to understand the Soviet delegation's fears and will do all we can to eliminate them.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

But in any case, are the risks which a larger number of inspections would involve in the Soviet Government's view really so great? Are they really so dangerous as to outweigh the advantages which an agreement would confer upon all, and in the most direct manner upon the Soviet Union?

Unfortunately, it is to be feared that if an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests is not concluded soon, explosions will be resumed on both sides, because each side will fear that in remaining inactive it will be reducing its own security. Thus on both sides vast wealth will once more be thrown into the bottomless abyss and sacrifices will once more be imposed upon peoples who await better living conditions.

I sincerely hope that the time is approaching when all these considerations and the data I have mentioned -- which everyone knows but which can never be too often emphasized -- will be seriously re-examined, bearing in mind all that has been said and all that remains to be said before the end of the present session of our Conference. Thus, during the forthcoming recess, we shall have to reconsider the situation on the basis of all the proposals which have been submitted and which are yet to be submitted, in the full realization of all that is at stake. Such at least is the Italian delegation's hope at this stage in our debate, and I am sure that we are not alone in feeling thus.

My delegation remains convinced that agreement is possible, and that a last and decisive effort must be made to attain it in view of the higher interests of mankind and peace.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) translation from French: Today we have heard some very important statements, and since we have the opportunity to comment, I should like to take the opportunity to make a few remarks concerning certain of these statements and to set out certain conclusions which I shall draw from the various statements made in the past.

First of all I should like to recall that, in the very important statement made by the Polish representative (supra, pp.5-10) and in the statement, also well supported by facts, made by the Soviet representative (supra, pp.16-23), it was

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emphasized that the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries are insisting that in order to reach a solution of the problem of nuclear tests a political decision must be taken. There can certainly be no question here of compromising and seeking to shelter behind scientific facts, since it was shown long ago that these facts indicate clearly that all the problems at issue could be immediately solved if we relied upon national systems of detection.

If the other arguments were insufficient, the quotation made today by the Soviet representative from the testimony of the United States Secretary of State before the Senate Committee would be sufficiently convincing (supra. p.22). He said, if I remember rightly, that what the United States detection and identification system is capable of discovering has not been revealed to the American public -- and incidentally it has not been revealed here either. Thus attempts are being made to hide from the public how much it is possible to detect and to identify with certainty by scientific means.

What is important, however, is certainly, as the Soviet Union has insistently pointed out in the past, as its representative emphasized here just now and as the Polish representative has also said, that in order to reach an agreement a political decision must be taken by the respective Governments.

Today, however, we have before us a document which has been submitted by the United States entitled "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America -- Memorandum of position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests" (ENDC/78). This document has been described in detail by the United States representative. After the few remarks which the United States representative has made here (supra. pp.10-16), what appears to be the significance of this memorandum? We are bound to say that, in the light of the data which have just been given by the representatives of Poland and the Soviet Union concerning the debates in the United States Senate, it lags a long way behind even the results which the United States have just achieved as regards nuclear tests. We know indeed that they are trying to maintain that science justifies them. However, the data which have been submitted to the United States Senate show clearly that this document lags considerably behind even their own scientific data, which were obtained with the idea

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of supporting the views they have long upheld here. Why is this? It is because the United States and the United Kingdom do not want an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests and are not trying to attain one.

The Italian representative, speaking today in support of the memorandum, for he supports all the United States positions, stated, and it is very interesting to note this, that if the United States is trying to obtain more than the number of inspections which its own arguments prove necessary, it is doing so in an effort to correct the rigidity of the Eastern countries (supra, p. 29). But if the proposals submitted by the United States and the other Western Powers have this aim, they are political proposals which have nothing to do with scientific data. It is a question of policy, and of a policy which would make it possible for the United States and the other Western Powers to gain a footing in the Socialist countries to do there as they will.

But let us see, in a more scientific manner, as the Western Powers claimed to do, what their proposals have been in the past from the point of view of their own reasoning, in the light of the new data we have at our disposal. You will remember that the Canadian representative introduced in his statement on 13 March 1963 (ENDC/PV.108, pp.22-24) a formula which was intended to sum up the considerations invoked by the Western Powers. This formula was quite well received by the Western representatives, for at the same meeting the United Kingdom representative expressed the opinion that it was a "very interesting formula," etc (ibid, p.27).

Let us see what are the implications of this formula in the light of the new data. That does not mean that we are in favour of such a line of argument. On the contrary we think that a political decision is necessary for the solution of this problem. Here is what the Canadian representative said on 13 March:

"Taking our equation and substituting certain quantities in those parameters, if we assign the value of 75 -- which has been mentioned as the total likely number of unidentifiable events -- to E, if we take the number of possible clandestine explosions as 10 (that is C), and for the time being assume that the values of the other factors are equal to unity, we get the probability of detecting the event (P_c) as

$$n \frac{10}{75} \times 1 \times 1 "$$

(ibid, p.24)

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

That was the final form of the equation which the Canadian representative submitted. He continued:

"I should say that the last two factors which I have mentioned relating to area and the composition of the inspection teams will not be equal to unity and will therefore reduce somewhat the probability of the detection of the ten events. If we are to be certain that a violation will be detected, P_0 should be equal to unity -- meaning certainty -- and if it works out then to be something less it will mean that a certain risk of violations is being accepted." (*ibid.* p.24)

Let us leave the Canadian representative's considerations and return to the new data which have been submitted to us today as they were submitted recently to the United States Senate.

Let us take the figure 12 as the number of doubtful phenomena which can take place in the Soviet Union and which is represented by the letter E. Let us take the figure 1 to represent P_0 , that is to say security. Let us represent E by 12 instead of 75. What then will be n, the number of inspections? It will be precisely 1.2, that is to say one and two-tenths inspections. This is not even two or three as the Soviet representative showed here, on the basis of western data and arguments, but 1.2, that is to say in round numbers one inspection per year. You see what conclusions can be reached if from time to time we analyse and discuss certain positions which have been expounded here by the Western Powers.

I wish to emphasize once more that we have no intention of becoming involved in discussions of details, for we are certain that all scientists, mathematicians and physicists are able to support their views with numerous arguments favourable to their own Governments, particularly if those Governments are their employers. If we were to become involved in the discussion of certain questions of detail, we should get nowhere. Indeed, I am convinced that some delegations would dispute what the others had said.

What is certain is that if we choose the figure 12 or 10 to represent the number of doubtful phenomena, we shall arrive at $n=1$ in the Canadian representative's formula, that is to say that one inspection per year would be sufficient to guarantee the observance of the agreement by a State which had accepted it.

I do not mean that one inspection is necessary. It is not even necessary to have any inspection at all, because the national detection systems are sufficient.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

If we embarked on a discussion of certain details of the Western proposals and particularly of certain positions taken up in the past by the Western Powers, there would come a time when certain aspects of the question would appear in a somewhat strange light.

I should therefore like to ask the Western delegations not to try and involve us in so-called scientific discussions which seem to have little relation to the facts, and to show a little more goodwill here, and try to come to a political decision on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests. They must not try to arrange matters in such a way that the intelligence services of the Western Powers can obtain all the information they want concerning the Eastern regimes or endeavour to break down the "narrow ... attitude" of those regimes, as our Italian colleague put it (supra. p.29). I would rather ask them to take a political decision which could facilitate an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, so that we can put an end to these sterile discussions and achieve as soon as possible the conclusion of an agreement. It does not seem to me to be necessary to go into recess in order to think about this. It is sufficient to base one's ideas -- and Governments can also do this -- on the information which we have at our disposal in order to reach a decision.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I had intended today to make a number of comments on the question under consideration, as well as on the statements made this morning, but there is too little time. In view of the late hour I am ready to postpone my statement until the next meeting.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and sixteenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Myrdal, representative of Sweden.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Italy and Bulgaria.

"The delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States tabled a memorandum of position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 3 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.